Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy and Its Impact on India’s National Security

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ABSTRACT
Pakistan asserts the origin of its nuclear power programmes lies in its adversarial relationship with India. Initially steps toward the development of Pakistan's nuclear programme date to the late 1950s, including with the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PACE) in 1956. President Z.A. Bhutto forcefully advocated the nuclear option and famously said in 1965 that “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, ever go hungry but we will get one of our own”.

Keywords-- Nuclear Policy, India, Pakistan, National Security

I. INTRODUCTION

After December 1971 defeat in the conflict with India, Bhutto issued a directive instructing the country’s nuclear establishment to build a nuclear detonation of a nuclear device within three years. India’s detonation of nuclear detonation of nuclear device May 1974 further pushed Islamabad to accelerate its nuclear weapons programme, although the Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan (PAFC) had already constituted a group in March of that year to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

The Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission, headed by Munir Ahmed Khan, focused on the development of plutonium route to nuclear weapon development using material from the safeguard Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), but its progress was inefficient due to the constraints imposed by the nuclear export control applied in the wake of India’s Nuclear Test. Around 1975 A.Q. Khan, a metallurgist working at a subsidiary of URENCO enrichment corporation in Netherlands returned to Pakistan to help his country to develop a uranium enrichment programme. Having brought centrifuge designs and business contacts back with him to develop a uranium enrichment.

Khan used various tactics, such as buying individual components rather than complete units, to evade export controls and acquire the necessary equipment. By the early 1980s Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility and A.Q. Khan would later assert that the country had acquired the capability to assemble the generation nuclear device as early as 1984.

Pakistan also received assistance from states, especially China. Beginning in the late 1970s Beijing provided Islamabad with various levels of nuclear and missile related assistances, including centrifuge equipment, warhead designs, HEU, components of various missile systems and technical expertise.

Eventually from the 1980s onwards, the Khan network diversified. Its activities and illicitly transferred nuclear technology and expertise to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The Khan network was officially dismantled in 2004, although questions still remain concerning the extent of the Pakistani political and military establishment’s involvement in the network’s activities.

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission popularly known as PAEC, is an administrative, governmental and autonomous science and technology research institution, responsible for the development of nuclear power sector in Pakistan. The primary purpose of PAEC is to control the peaceful development of Nuclear Technology in as well as development of reactor technology in country.

In 1955, Pakistan government approved the establishment of a government agency to supervise the nuclear energy, establishment under the atomic energy council Act of 1956. Pakistan Prime Minister Huseyn Suhrawardy established the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and appointed its first Chairman, Nazir Ahmad, a renowned experimental Physicist. Its first technical member was Dr. Salimuzzaman Siddiqui, who founded the agency’s Chemical laboratories. Dr. Raziuddin Siddiqui, a mathematical physicist was put in the change to the research and development directories to the agency.

In 1972, the commission was transferred from the Science and Technology Research Division to the
Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Bhutto immediately replaced I.H. Usmani with Munir Ahmed Khan a nuclear engineer, working as the head of the IAEA’S Reactor Engineer Division. With the appointment of Munir Ahmad Khan, Bhutto orchestrated the nuclear weapons research programme.

The PAEC led the ground breaking work in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure and atomic weapons under the administration of Munir Ahmed Khan.

PAEC Conducted the first cold Test of a working nuclear device on 11th March 1983 at Kirana Hills which was followed by another two dozen cold tests till the early 1990s.

PAEC Also ran its separate Nuclear Power Program and contributed in the electricity generation demands in Karachi.

On 28th May 1998, PAEC Scientists conducted the first Pakistani test of nuclear weapons in Raskoh hills in Chagai district, followed by further nuclear test in Kharan Desert.

As of today PAEC is now the largest Science and Technology organization of the country both in terms of scientific/technical manpower and the scope of its activities starting with a Karachi Nuclear Power Plant and Pakistan. Atomic Research Reactor at Nilnore and a neutron charged particle accelerator a neutron particle accelerator.

II. PAKISTAN NUCLEAR POLICY IMPACT ON INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

Pakistan is becoming increasingly ungovernable and unstable. Pakistan’s policy of using terrorism as a pressure point on India is a major challenge for India as is Pakistan’s all weather friendship with China. Sino-Pakistan nexus is likely to deepen further as China’s global profile increases and Pakistan’s own problems deepen both china and Pakistan are nuclear countries. Radical elements in Pakistan do not countenance a prosperous and strong India. How should India deal with Pakistan our policy towards Pakistan must be based on deterrence as well as engagement. Pakistani society is getting differentiated and multilayered. We should be looking for building favorable constituencies in Pakistan particularly amongst its civil society and youth. We should build our capacities to meet the terrorism challenge emanating from Pakistan, but a strategy of no-dialogue may not prove to be effective was should also understand Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities and learn to exploit them to our advantage.

In particular, we should highlight the situation in Baluchistan and Gilgit Baltistan. We should ensure that Pakistan does not get any special role in Afghanistan that would harm India’s interests. The Pakistan army appears to be under some pressure as reflected in General Kayani’s recent statement ‘Peaceful Co-existence’ and the importance of democracy. We should be using both negative and positive levels vis-avis Pakistan. We should not hesitate to establish.

Hence from above we can conclude that Pakistan always favor terrorism and violence so its nuclear policy. Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy’s main aim is only to threaten India and disrupt its national security. Pakistan has always complete with India not in a positive attitude. It always has completed with India to prove itself superior and better than India.

Since independence Pakistan made every effort to weaken India socially economically, psychologically and in various fields. Its policies are also in favor of destroying India. For this as we studied Pakistan has signed many treaties with China so that China may provide expenses for carrying out its nuclear power projects. Pakistan also supplies nuclear weapons and arms to neighboring countries of India.

China may provide expenses for carrying out its nuclear power projects. Pakistan also supplies nuclear weapons and arms to neighboring countries of India like Bangladesh, Myanmar. This has increased security threats for India.

Pakistan objective is to complete solely with India’s nuclear weapon development and to solve as a deterrent to India which has overwhelming conventional military strength. Unlike India the background to the development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan does not exhibit any of the aspirations for becoming a major power nor to enhance its international prestige.

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT STATUS

In the response to the US India deal, Pakistan has sought to increase its Civilian Nuclear Corporation with China. Under a previous Corporation, framework China had supplied Pakistan with two pressurized water reactors Chashma-1 Chashma-2, Which entered into commercial operation in 2000 and 2011 respectively. In April 2010 reports confirmed long standing rumors that the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) had agreed to supply two additional 650 MW power reactors to Pakistan are rumored to have an agreement for a 5th 1000 MW unit at Chashma Nuclear Complex.

From above readings we can conclude that China fully supports Pakistan in its nuclear development which generates a serious concern for India’s national security.

IV. CONCLUSION

Hence we concluded that the history of nuclear development in India and Pakistan is fundamentally different. So are their nuclear policies. India’s Nuclear Policy’s main aim is to support armament of nuclear weapons only for self defense and for own’s security purpose. India’s policy is against the use of Nuclear weapons for self interest.
On the other hand Pakistan’s Nuclear policy supports nuclear armament for propagating violence and terror in the world. Pakistan has been declared terrorism supporting nation and threat for world peace, due to its violent nuclear policy. This problem has direct relation with India and this attitude of Pakistan Nuclear Policy severely affects India’s national security to a great extent.

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